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Constitutional Law: Speech That Aids and Abets Tax
Fraud
Gordon Buttorff and Charles Dodge advocated their belief in the
unconstitutionality of income taxation by making speeches to interested groups.' One such group, made up of workers in a farm machinery plant in Iowa, invited Buttorff and Dodge to speak at a series of
public meetings.2 The meetings were well attended and extensively
covered by the local news media. 3 At the meetings, Buttorff and
Dodge spoke primarily about the Constitution, the Bible, and the
graduated income tax.' In response to questions following the
speeches, Buttorff and Dodge suggested that interested members of
the audience might participate in the tax protest movement by filing
false employee withholding forms." Such action, they asserted, would
effectively prevent the government from withholding taxes.' Fifteen
individuals, most of whom testified to having been influenced by
other sources of tax protest ideas, 7 later filed false withholding claims8
and were subsequently convicted of tax fraud.9 The participation of
1. United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 622 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
906 (1978).
2. Brief for Appellant Dodge at 1-2, United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th
Cir. 1978). Buttorff and Dodge were invited by employees of the John Deere Tractor
Works in Dubuque, Iowa, to speak to their group. Two of the John Deere employees
had previously filed fraudulent withholding forms and circulated tax protest literature
among the employees at the plant. Id.
3. Id. at 2.
4. 572 F.2d at 622.
5. Id.
6. Brief for Appellee at 2, United States v. Buttofff, 572 F.2d 619. Withholding
form W-4 is prepared by employees to indicate to their employer the number of income
tax withholding allowances to which they are entitled. Withholding form W-4E is filed
with employers by eligible employees to certify that they incurred no income tax
liability in the previous year and expect to incur no liability in the current year. By
indicating a large enough number of allowances on the form or certifying no tax liability, employees may escape the withholding of taxes. See 572 F.2d at 622-23 & nn.5 &
6 (IRS agent's description of forms),
7. Id. at 623. For a description of the activities of several tax protest organizations, see Ex Parte Tammen, 438 F. Supp. 349, 356 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
8. Although the fraudulent forms were filed, the principals' employer ignored
them and continued to withhold taxes on the basis of previously-filed, correct withholding certificates. In fact, the fraudulent forms were not accepted by the employer
until after the principals had been indicated and were awaiting trial. Brief for Appellant Dodge, supra note 2, at 3.
9. United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 622 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
906 (1978); United States v. Hinderman, 528 F.2d 100, 101 (8th Cir. 1976).
I.R.C. § 7205, the provision under which the fifteen protestors were convicted,
provides:
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Buttorff and Dodge in the events leading to these convictions was
limited to presenting their ideas on taxes, discussing common methods of tax evasion, and providing a W-4 tax form to one of the convicted individuals.' 0
Two years later, Buttorf and Dodge were charged with aiding and
abetting the filing of fraudulent withholding forms in violation of
section 2 of the United States Criminal Code" and section 7205 of the
Internal Revenue Code,'" and were convicted in United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.'3 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that evidence of the defendants'
role in advising the convicted principals to file false forms was sufficient to support the jury finding of aiding and abetting tax law violations," and that the defendants' convictions did not infringe their
first amendment freedom of expression. United States v. Buttorff,
572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 906 (1978).
The first amendment" protects pure speech from government
regulations." That protection, however, is not absolute. The first
Any individual required to supply information to his eiiployer under section
3402 [the employer withholding provisions] who willfully supplies false or
fraudulent information, or who willfully fails to supply information thereunder which would require an increase in the tax to be withheld under section
3402, shall, in lieu of any other penalty provided by law. . . upon conviction
thereof, be fined not more than $500, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both.
10. 572 F.2d at 622-23. Only one of the fifteen convicted principals testified to
an affirmative action, other than speaking, performed by either Buttorff or Dodge.
Buttorff allegedly delivered a W-4 form to the home of one of the principals with the
number "20" filled in the exemption blank. There was some confusion as to whether
Buttorff or the principal subsequently changed the "20" to a "28." Id. at 623. The court
emphasized that "[n]o other principal testified that either defendant actually assisted him in preparing a W-4 or W-4E, or was with him when he filed such a form."
Id.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See notes 46-58 infra and accompanying text.
12. I.R.C. § 7205. See note 9 supra. Defendants Buttorff and Dodge were convicted on a total of 17 counts of aiding and abetting a violation of section 7205, and
were thus punished as principals under that statute. 572 F.2d at 622 & nn.7-9.
13. 572 F.2d at 619 (syllabus).
14. See text accompanying notes 66-70 supra.
15. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. "Pure speech" is expression without any accompanying action on the part
of the speaker. Pure speech is generally given absolute protection by the first amendment unless it falls within one of several unprotected categories of valueless speech.
See text accompanying notes 17-22 infra. In general, therefore, constitutional evaluation of pure speech is a categorization process: it is absolutely protected by the first
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amendment does not extend to protect certain forms of speech that
have been found to be particularly repugnant to social order. For
example, obscenity," offensive speech,'8 fighting words,'" speech that
disturbs one's privacy,2" or verbal acts' such as extortion may be
regulated by criminal statutes. In addition to speech that is itself the
substance of the criminal act, speech that merely advocates illegal
activity may also be denied first amendment protection when such
advocacy is so closely related to the crime advocated as to be part of
the crime itself.2 Absent this very close relationship, advocacy of
lawless activity is protected.
The test for distinguishing between protected and unprotected
advocacy of illegality was set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in the landmark decision of Brandenburg v. Ohio.21 The
amendment unless it can be categorized by judicial analysis as an unprotected form.
See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969). Despite this generally absolute approach, some courts have relied on what is
basically a balancing of interests involved as a background policy aid in deciding
whether certain speech is protected. See Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S.
441, 449 (1974); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct.
291 (1978); United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1022 (1976). See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758-59 (1974); Gasparinetti v.
Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 320 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978) (quoting
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961)).
Cases involving speech mixed with action, on the other hand, generally apply a
balancing of the importance of the government's interest in suppressing such activity
with the individual's right to such expression under the first amendment as a means
of deciding whether or not speech is protected. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
22-26 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). But see Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969) (conviction reversed after finding that conviction possibly rested solely on words
uttered during actionable conduct.) See generallyEly, FlagDesecration:ACase Study
in The Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARv.
L. REV. 1482 (1975).
17. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
18. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
19. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
20. See Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
21. See United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1976).
22. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Some courts and commentators have reasoned, as did Justice Douglas in his concurrence to the
Brandenburgopinion, that advocacy of illegal acts may be regulated only at the point
where speech is so closely associated with the acts advocated that it, in effect, loses
its status as speech: "The line between what is permissible and not subject to control
and what may be made impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between
ideas and overt acts." 395 U.S. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring). See, e.g., People v.
Bohmer, 46 Cal. App. 3d 185, 120 Cal. Rptr. 136, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975).
See also notes 61-62 infra.
23. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Brandenburg Court held that "the constitutional guarantees of free
speech ...

do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of

the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." 24
The Brandenburg test has two parts, both of which must be
satisfied before speech may constitutionally be punished.2 The first
part examines the content of the speech; the second part is directed
toward the context in which the speech was uttered. In applying the
first part of the Brandenburgstandard,2" a court must examine the
24. Id. at 447. See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973):
Since the uncontroverted evidence showed that . . . [the] statement was
not directed to any person or group of persons, it cannot be said that he was
advocating, in the normal sense, any action. And since there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import of the language, that his words
were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those
words could not be punished by the State on the ground that they had a
'tendency to lead to violence.' "
See generally L. TRmE, AimsmcA CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 576 (1st ed. 1978); Baker,
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964 (1978);
BeVier, The FirstAmendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance
and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978); Ely, supra note 16; Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1975); Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A
Speech Test for all Seasons? 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 151 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, A Speech Test]; Comment, Brandenburgv. Ohio, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 210
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Brandenburg].
25. 395 U.S. at 447. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973); Healy
v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 185 (1972); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 360 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10, 17
(N.D. Cal. 1977). See generally L. TRmE, supranote 24, at 616-17 ; BeVier, supra note
24, at 332, 338.
26. Commonly referred to as the "incitement test," this portion of the
Brandenburgstandard was derived from a decision by Judge Learned Hand in Masses
Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). See
L. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 616-17; BeVier, supra note 24, at 332. Hand sought to give
unlimited protection to the advocacy of ideas, but not advocacy of unlawful action,
by distinguishing between the two: "If one stops short of urging upon others that it is
their duty or their interest to resist the law, . . . one should not be held to have
attempted to cause its violation." 244 F. at 540. An incitement test alone, however,
would give no protection to the ineffective inciter, that is, a speaker could be punished
for urging illegality before a totally unreceptive audience. See L. TaME, supra note 24,
at 617. For an excellent and detailed analysis of Judge Hand's views on the first
amendment and the varied treatment those views have received since originally expressed, see Gunther, supra note 24.
Several commentators have suggested that Brandenburgsubstitutes "incitement"
for "clear and present danger," see note 31 infra, as the basis for the standard. See T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPiEsSION, 75, 157, 404 (1970); Kalven,
Professor Ernst Freund and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 236 n.6
(1973); Comment, A Speech Test, supra note 24, at 158 n.36.
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content of the speech to determine whether the speaker intended to
incite imminent illegal activity.Y The speaker's conduct must be protected unless it is shown that he intended unlawful consequences to
occur immediately, and his words were directed toward that result.
This restrictive content test encourages free and unlimited public
discussion of ideas. In order to ensure robust discussion, even speech
that advocates illegal ideas must be allowed. Although such speech
may promote behavior that is inconsistent with social order, it is felt
that if speech may be silenced simply for advocating what is currently
illegal, legitimate dissent may be too easily stifled and meaningful
public debate destroyed.Y Thus, under the first prong of the
Brandenburgtest, speech that advocates illegal acts is to be prohibited only in those extreme cases when it amounts to a direct incite9
ment to immediate lawlessness.
An additional measure of protection for speech is provided by the
second part of the Brandenburgtest 3°-the context inquiry. This part
requires a court to examine closely the setting in which the words
were spoken to determine the degree of likelihood that criminal action would immediately occur as a direct result of the speech." If such
analysis reveals a high probability of imminent lawlessness, the advocacy may be constitutionally punished. If, however, "the present danger of immediate evil"3 2 is unlikely, given the circumstances, the
27. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 173 (1st Cir. 1969); Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10, 18 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18
(1971) (defendant's action was symbolic conduct rather than pure speech, yet court
required showing of specific intent to incite illegal activity).
28. See T. EMERSON, supra note 26, at 6-7.
29. See id. at 10.
30. Even when the content standard of Brandenburgis met, the court must also
meet the context test in order to prohibit advocacy of illegality. Glen v. Hongisto, 438
F. Supp. 10, 18 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
31. The context portion of the Brandenburgdoctrine essentially crystalizes the
rule developed in a long line of first amendment cases holding that if speech is to be
prohibited because it creates the danger of illegality, that danger must be "clear and
present." See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("[tjhe question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree."); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting,
joined by Brandeis, J.) ("it is only the present danger of immediate evil . . .that
warrants government action interfering with private rights."); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("no danger flowing from speech
can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is...
imminent . . ...
"). See generally M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME
COURT AND JUDIcul. REviEw, 46-75 (1966); Comment, A Speech Test, supra note 24, at
153-64.
32. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919).
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advocacy must be protected in order to satisfy the first amendment
objective of full and complete discussion of ideas.
"Imminence" is at the heart of the first amendment protection
34
it is an element common
afforded pure speech under Brandenburg;
to both the content and context facets of the test." The requirement
that the illegal activity advocated must pose an imminent threat in
order for the advocacy to be unprotected serves to further the first
amendment's purpose of allowing thorough public airing of ideas in
at least two ways. First, the imminence requirement allows advocacy
of illegal acts to be regulated only in those cases in which there is no
alternate means of preventing actual commission of the crime. Obviously, the threat posed to social order is not the result of advocacy
as such, but the result of the ultimate illegal act." Therefore, pure
speech should only be regulated when it incites illegality that is so
immediate that the consequences of the advocacy cannot be counteracted by the listener's rational consideration of contrary ideas or by
the intervention of forces of order." If the danger is not imminent,
there is time for full discussion. The necessity of interfering with a
fundamental right is thereby obviated." Also, if there is sufficient
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971):
[There is] no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their sensibilities
.... There may be some persons about with such lawless and violent proclivities, but that is an insufficient base upon which to erect, consistently
with constitutional values, a governmental power to force persons who wish
to ventilate their dissident views into avoiding . . . expression.
Id. at 23. See also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) ("statute would have
been . . . constitutional had . . . [it been] construed . . . to apply only when there
was a likelihood that the person addressed would make an immediate violent response."); Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10, 18 (N.D. Cal. 1977) ("finding makes no
mention of the likelihood that the publication would effect the result supposedly intended"). See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 26, at 6-10.
34. T. EMERSON, supra note 26, at 404. But see, Comment, A Speech Test, supra
note 24, at 166-86. The Supreme Court has, however, identified several institutional
exceptions to the Brandenburgtest and not required a showing of imminence in those
circumstances. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (regulations promulgated
by a school or college); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (military regulations);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (speaker is a government employee and the
government regulates such speech).
35. See 395 U.S. at 447; text accompanying note 24 supra.
36. See T. EMERSON, supra note 26, at 403.
37. Professor Martin Shapiro identified the counteracting influences as "the
democratic process" and the "normal police instruments." M. SHumo, supra note 31,
at 50. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also
L. TREE, supra note 24, at 621.
38. "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
33.
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time, the emotions of the listeners may cool, thus lessening the probability of rash illegal action. Indeed, most decisions dealing with
the imminence question have involved highly emotional situations,
in which a speech could possibly incite an immediate, uncontrollable
reaction that could not be prevented without suppressing the speech
itself.39 The imminence requirement, therefore, limits the scope of
unprotected advocacy in a way that is consistent with society's interest in public debate but responsive to society's interest in preventing
lawlessness. Second, since the criminality advocated must be imminent at the time of the speech, a speaker is better able to judge at
that time whether advocacy will be protected or not. Without the
imminence requirement, a speaking might be punished for unforeseeable criminal acts occurring at some indefinite future time.40 This
open-ended liability for the unforeseeable future would cause speakers to hesitate to engage in spirited advocacy. 4
The importance of the imminence factor was recognized early in
modern first amendment jurisprudence. It may be traced back over
half a century to the original version of the "clear and present dan2
ger" test formulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. UnitedStates"
43
and Abrams v. United States. Although the Supreme Court adopted
this formulation, the imminence aspect of the clear and present danger test was seriously diluted in Whitney v. California," in which the
test was broadly construed to allow prohibition of speech having
not enforced silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). See also M. SHAiRo, supra note 31, at 52-54.
39. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Ku Klux Klan rally
filmed and broadcast on television); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(organizational tactics of the Communist Party); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d
340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973) (antiwar riot).
40. See T. EMERSON, supra note 26, at 405: ("[EJxpression may be seriously
inhibited when the speaker knows what he says can be used against him at a later time
if some unforeseen action ensues.

.

.

. "). Cf. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165,

188 (1st Cir. 1969) (Coffin, J., dissenting) ("I cannot believe that this delayed fuse
approach to determining the conspiratorial culpability ... would have anything other
than a pronounced chilling effect-indeed that of a sub-zero blast-on all kinds of
efforts to sway public opinion.").
41. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 189 (1st Cir. 1969) (Coffin, J.,

dissenting).
42. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
43. 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify

punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may
punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent
danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.
Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
44. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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nothing more than a tendency to interfere with the public peace and
security." Brandenburg, however, clearly rejected that interpretation, expressly overruling the Whitney case" for failing to require
imminence. 7 In the years since Brandenburg,the imminence requirement has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. 8 In Hess v.
Indiana," for example, the Court recognized the importance of imminence by reversing a conviction for speech that "amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future
time."5 Thus, the Brandenburgstandard broadly protects the right
45. Id. at 370-71. Justice Brandeis concurred with the majority opinion in
Whitney, but expressed concern with the failure of the court to consider the imminence
of the criminality threatened by the defendants:
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no
danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the
incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion. . .. Only an emergency can justify
repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom.
Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (Justice Holmes joined in this concurrence).
In the wake of the Whitney majority opinion, however, the imminence factor
became a rather minor element in the first amendment test for protection of advocacy.
The clear and present danger standard evolved into a balancing test, comparing the
interest of the government in proscribing a certain expression with the interest of the
individual in uttering that expression. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,
297-98 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1957); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
46. 395 U.S. at 447, 449. See Comment, Brandenburg, supra note 24, at 214.
47. Although Brandenburg overruled Whitney, 395 U.S. at 449, it did so citing
the case of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), as authority. 395 U.S. at 447.
In Dennis, however, a strict imminence requirement was not applied. That Court
adopted what could be more accurately described as a balancing test, punishing advocacy that had the potential of causing a serious national danger. See Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Yet, in the same paragraph in which Dennis is cited,
Brandenburgspecifically required a showing of imminence in both parts of its test. 395
U.S. at 447. This emphasis on imminence and categorization in Brandenburg,rather
than balancing, would seem to contravene the Dennis decision, but since the
Brandenburg Court relied on Dennis for support, an argument could be made that
Dennis is still applicable to those cases involving extremely grave national security
crises. Such a view would tend to support reading another element into the
Brandenburgtest: an inquiry into the seriousness of the incited crime. See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring). An alternative
interpretation of the Brandenburg Court's preservation of Dennis is that Dennis, by
discussing imminence, stated the correct first amendment standard but merely misapplied it in response to the nationwide anti-Communist hysteria of the period. See
generally Comment, A Speech Test, supra note 24, at 157.
48. See cases cited at note 31 supra.
49. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
50. Id. at 108. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192 (1972); Gooding v.
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of free speech, limiting it only in narrow circumstances in which the
danger is so imminent that preventing speech itself would be the sole
means of preventing a serious harm.
In Buttorff, the court upheld the defendants' conviction for aiding and abetting the filing of false tax withholding forms.-1 The defendants had done nothing more than advocate the filing of false statements as a method of protesting government policy.2 The court of
appeals, therefore, had two questions before it: first, whether the
defendants' oral advocacy amounted to aiding and abetting; and second, if the advocacy was aiding and abetting, whether the conviction
could stand under the protections afforded speech by the first amendment as outlined by Brandenburg. The Eighth Circuit panel answered both of these questions affirmatively. This Comment analyzes the court's application of the Brandenburgtest and describes
the potential effect of Buttorff on the first amendment protection of
speech that advocates illegal acts.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971); note 25
supra.
With few exceptions, lower courts have interpreted Brandenburgconsistently with
the Supreme Court decision in Hess. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 291 (1978) (village ordinance regulating Nazi activity
struck down); Blue v. Hogan, 553 F.2d 960, 963 (5th Cir. 1977) (remanded to properly
apply legal standard to prisoner prohibited from receiving revolutionary magazines);
Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1976) (reversed
denial of license to campus homosexual group because no evidence that such license
would incite group members to commit imminent lawless action); United States v.
Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976) (conviction
of one who threatened to assassinate foreign leader upheld); Leary v. United States,
431 F.2d 85, 89 (5th Cir. 1970) (remanded to determine whether denial of bail to
marijuana smuggler was proper in light of Brandenburg); High 01' Times, Inc. v.
Busbee, 449 F. Supp. 364, 370 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (state statute may not proscribe the
printing of all drug-related material); Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10, 18 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (injunction imposed on local union officers improper because inflammatory publication not shown to be likely to produce imminent lawless action); Holodnak v. Avco
Corp. 381 F. Supp. 191, 195, 203 (D. Conn. 1974) (mistaken union statement saying
that workers have constitutional right to wildcat strikes was not an incitement to
imminent lawless action), modified, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892
(1975). But see Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973) (transfer
of teacher upheld because of teacher's media appearances).
51. 572 F.2d at 623.
52. The only apparent affirmative action by either defendant involved delivering
a W-4 form to one of the principals. Id. See note 10 supra. The court, however, made
no discernible effort to rely on this fact for conviction. Cf. Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576 (1969) (where conviction might have been based either on pure speech or accompanying action, reviewing court must assume it was based on the pure speech component
in deciding constitutionality).
53. 572 F.2d at 624.
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Section 2 of the Criminal Code54 is the general federal aiding and
abetting statute that is used, ancillary to substantive federal criminal
statutes, to prosecute accessories to a criminal act." The statute provides,
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United
States, is punishable as a principal."
Since the aiding and abetting statute is applicable to many forms of
criminal activity,57 its standard is necessarily broadly defined." In
defiming the elements of aiding and abetting crime, the Supreme
Court in Nye & Nissen v. United States59 required a showing that one
"insome sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate
in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
55. See United States v. Simmons, 503 F.2d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1974). Federal and
state aiding and abetting statutes, whether of general application or embodied in a
specific criminal statute, have generally consolidated the different degrees of accessory
liability found in the common law. At common law, there were three classifications of
accessories with different levels of liability: (1) accessory before the fact; (2) accessory
after the fact; and (3) principals in the second degree. See generally W. LAFAv & A.
Scor, HANDBOOK ON CamNAL LAW § 63, at 495 (1972); R. PERKins, CmdNAL LAW § 8,
at 643 (2d ed. 1969). Aiding and abetting statutes treat aiders and abettors as principals to eliminate the necessity of the second degree. Acessories after the fact are now
commonly dealt with through the crime of obstruction of justice. See generally W.
LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra § 66, at 524-25.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Maselli, 534 F.2d 1197 (6th Cir. 1976) (prostitution); United States v. Le Faivre, 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974) (illegal gambling), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975); United States v. Wiebold, 507 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1974)
(narcotics offense); United States v. Wilson, 500 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1974) (embezzlement); United States v. Cody, 495 F.2d 742 (8th Cir. 1974) (bank robbery); United
States v. Owen, 492 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir.) (postal fraud), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965
(1974); United States v. Berger, 456 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir.) (corporate officer aiding corporation in criminal activity), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972); United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972) (false statement on petition for permanent U.S. residence).
58. Compare Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) with
United States v. Wiebold, 507 F.2d 932, 934 (8th Cir. 1974) and cases cited at note 57
supra.
59. 336 U.S. 613 (1949). After Nye & Nissen was decided, the text of section 2
was slightly altered. Act of Oct. 31, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-248, 65 Stat. 717 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976)). The changes did not, however, affect the Nye &Nissen standard,
which courts continue to apply. See, e.g., United States v. Wiebold, 507 F.2d 932, 934
(8th Cir. 1974).
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his action to make it succeed."0 The Eighth Circuit adheres to Nye
& Nissen,' adding the requirement of "some affirmative participation which at least encourages the perpetrator.""2
Buttorff is the first case in which the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has applied section 2 to the aiding and abetting of tax fraud.
Other federal courts have only rarely made such an application, 3
relying instead on the Internal Revenue Code's specific criminal provision for prosecution of aiders and abettors of tax fraud. 4 More
60. 336 U.S. at 619 (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir.
1938)) (Hand, J.). In United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951), the Court elaborated on this standard by adding that it means "to assist the perpetrator of the crime."
Id. at 64.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977); United States v. Baumgarten, 517 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975); United States v. Wiebold, 507 F.2d 932 (8th Cir.
1974); United States v. Thomas, 469 F.2d 145 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
957 (1973); Snyder v. United States, 448 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Kelton, 446 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1971).
Other courts of appeals have interpreted the Nye & Nissen decision in slightly
different fashions. For example, the Second Circuit has found liability where a
"defendant consciously assisted the commission of the specific crime in some active
way." United States v. Dickerson, 508 F.2d 1216, 1218 (2d Cir. 1975). The First Circuit
has adhered to a standard encompassing "participation at some stage accompanied by
knowledge of the result and intent to bring about that result." United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 399 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). The Fifth Circuit's
interpretation involves the association of the defendant "with the commission of the
crime, that he participated in it with a desire that it be accomplished, and that he
committed some overt act designed to make it a success." United States v. Hightower,
512 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting United States v. Barfield, 447 F.2d 85 (5th
Cir. 1971)). The Ninth Circuit adds the requirement that a defendant "actively assist
in planning and preparing for the perpetration of the crime and assumes a station with
the knowledge of the perpetrators where he may be able to assist. .

.

... United States

v. Peichev, 500 F.2d 917, 920 (9th Cir. 1974).
Despite the relative subjectivity of the standards employed under 18 U.S.C. § 2
(1976), two essential elements appear in various forms throughout the cases: (1) specific criminal intent to aid in the commission of a crime, and (2) active or constructive
participation in the crime.
62. United States v. Baumgarten, 517 F.2d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 878 (1975); United States v. Wiebold, 507 F.2d 932, 934 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Thomas, 469 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 957 (1973).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943) (concealment of
assets); United States v. Frazier, 365 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1966) (concealment of assets),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d
925 (2d Cir. 1957) (misdeeds of corporate officers); United States v. Meriwether, 329
F. Supp. 1156 (S.D. Ala. 1971) (same), affl'd, 469 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1972).
64. See I.R.C. § 7206 (2). The statute provides:
Any person who . . . [w]illfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or
advises the preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any
matter arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim,
or other document, which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter,
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importantly, prior to Buttorff no federal court had ever applied the
aiding and abetting statute to prosecute advocacy of tax fraud when
the aiding and abetting consisted of pure speech. In fact, section 2
has apparently never been applied in any case in which the defendant
had a serious first amendment defense."
whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the
person authorized or required to present such return, affidavit, claim, or
document; ... shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both,
together with the costs of prosecution.
The standard used to determine whether a person is guilty of aiding and abetting
tax fraud under § 7206 (2) is set forth in United States v. Crum, 529 F.2d 1380, 1382
n.2 (9th Cir. 1976):
First: That the income tax return [or statement] described was ...
fraudulent or false as to some material matter; Second: That the defendant
had aided or assisted in or procured or advised the preparation of filing of
that return; and Third: That the defendant did so wilfully.
Despite the existence of I.R.C. § 7206 (2), defendants Buttorff and Dodge were
prosecuted and convicted under the broad aiding and abetting provision of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. The defendants argued on appeal that it was "inappropriate" to use a broad,
general provision to convict when a more narrowly-drawn standard was available. Brief
for Appellant Dodge, supra note 2, at 8. The Eighth Circuit court dismissed the argument, stating that even when a broader provision carries a harsher penalty, the prosecutor has discretion to proceed thereunder. Since 18 U.S.C. § 2 carried a lesser penalty
in Buttorff than I.R.C. § 7206 (2), the court reasoned that application of the broader
statute was, a fortiori, appropriate. 572 F.2d at 625.
65. But cf. People v. Bohmer, 46 Cal. App. 3rd 185, 120 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1975)
(defendant convicted under a California aiding and abetting statute based on 18
U.S.C. § 2, for inciting damage to railroad property by means of a fiery antiwar speech
at the scene of a war protest demonstration), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975).
Those few cases in which speakers have been prosecuted on theories of accessorial
liability have often involved advocacy of lawless action of a symbolic nature. In general, such case4 have been prosecuted under specific aider and abettor provisions,
rather than the general provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2. See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S.
116 (1966) (state legislator who allegedly aided and abetted draft evasion under 50
U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (1976)); Spock v. United States, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969)
(charge of conspiracy to aid and abet draft evasion under 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a)
(1976)); National Mobilization Comm. to End the War in Viet Nam v. Foran, 297 F.
Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (aiding and abetting an antiwar riot under 18 U.S.C. § 2101
(1976)), affl'd, 411 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1969).
Conspiracy has also been a frequently used alternative to general aiding and
abetting in cases in which a speaker is prosecuted for advocacy of illegal activity of a
symbolic nature. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See generally Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First
Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. Ray. 189 (1972); Note, Conspiracy and the First
Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872 (1970).
Since the Buttorff decision dealt only with the first amendment claim of the
alleged aiders and abettors, Buttorff and Dodge, the court did not discuss the potential
first amendment claim of the principals. Courts have uniformly denied first amend-
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Nevertheless, in Buttorff, the Eighth Circuit panel held that the
activities of Buttorff and Dodge were sufficient to permit a jury to
find aiding and abetting under the section 2 standard.66 The court
relied on the testimony of all fifteen principals in the tax fraud to find
a sufficient causal element between the defendants' advocacy and the
subsequent filing of false withholding forms. 7 Although only one of
the principals testified that Buttorff and Dodge actually provided
him with a tax form," and most testified to having other sources of
information on tax evasion," the court affirmed the jury finding that
the defendants were guilty of aiding and abetting tax fraud because
"by speaking to large groups of persons, [they] sought to advance
[their] ideas and encourage others to evade income taxes."70
The next question for the court was whether the first amendment
protection of pure speech prohibited the convictions of the defendants under the aiding and abetting statute." The court recognized
that the constitutional issue required an application of the
Brandenburgtest." The court restated the standard as a means of
distinguishing "between speech which merely advocates law violation
and speech which incites imminent lawless activity. . . . The former
7 3
is protected; the latter is not.
The court's application of the test to the facts in Buttorff, however, was extremely brief. Although the court posited that the first
ment protection, however, to tax evaders who claim that their failure to pay taxes was
an act of symbolic expression. See, e.g., United States v. Quilty, 541 F.2d 172 (7th Cir.
1976) (pacifist taxpayer may not escape liability for violating withholding statutes by
resorting to the first amendment); United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir.

1973) (first amendment does not protect an individual who violates tax laws for the

purpose of protest). These symbolic expression cases did not, of course, reach the issue

of whether pure speech advocating such symbolic illegality was protected under the
first amendment.
66. 572 F.2d at 623.
67. Id. at 622. The government obtained affidavits detrimental to Buttorff and
Dodge from all fifteen principals immediately following their convictions. Brief for
Appellant Dodge, supra note 2, at 3-4. Since Buttorff and Dodge had refused to testify
for the defense at the principals' trial, id. at 5-6; 572 F.2d at 626, the affidavits
obtained from the principals may have been biased against the two speakers. The
principals' testimony in court also provided an opportunity for expression of a biased

view. See 572 F.2d at 623 n.10. The Eighth Circuit opinion did not discuss the potential
for biased testimony in the case. The evidence upon which the jury supported its
verdict was apparently viewed as sufficient to sustain it despite possible bias.
68. 572 F.2d at 623. See note 10 supra.
69. 572 F.2d at 623.

70. Id.
71. 572 F.2d at 623-24.
72. Id. at 624. See text accompanying note 24 supra.

73. 572 F.2d at 624.
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amendment issue presented a close question, 4 discusson was limited
to one short paragraph:
Although the speeches here do not incite the type of imminent
lawless activity referred to in criminal syndicalism cases, the defendants did go beyond mere advocacy of tax reform. They explained
how to avoid withholding and their speeches and explanations incited several individuals to activity that violated federal law and
had the potential of substantially hindering the administration of
the revenue. This speech is not entitled to first amendment protection and.

. .

was sufficient action to constitute aiding and abetting

the filing of false or fraudulent withholding forms2'
Because of the summary treatment given the first amendment question by the Buttorff court, it is not clear what the court's considerations really were in concluding that the defendants' speech was unprotected. If the facts of the case are more thoroughly analyzed, the
court's application of the Brandenburg standard may be criticized
both on the content and context levels.
In its examination of the content of defendants' speech, the
Buttorff court found that such speech was not protected because it
went "beyond mere advocacy of tax reform" into an explanation of
"how to avoid withholding.""8 In making that distinction, the court
implied that the line between protected and unprotected advocacy
lies somewhere between advocacy of tax reform and explanation of
specific techniques for tax avoidance. There is, however, a rather
broad range of possible advocacy between these two extremes. 7 When
the Buttorff court held that the content of the defendants' advocacy
was unprotected because it went beyond tax reform to advocacy of
specific techniques of evasion, it did not draw a very precise line.
The line drawn by the Buttorff court can be traced with greater
precision by recalling that the court purportedly relied on the
Brandenburgcase to answer the first amendment question posed by
the defendants' conviction. 8 The Buttorff court cited Brandenburg
for the proposition that speech that "merely advocates law violation"
is protected and speech that "incites imminent lawless activity" is
not. 9 The Brandenburgstandard, even as restated in Buttorff, leaves
74. Id. at 622.
75. Id. at 624.
76. Id. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
77. For example, activity that would appear to lie between the two extremes
cited by the court includes advocacy of a public demonstration to show the need for
tax reform, general advocacy of tax evasion to achieve reform, general advocacy of tax
evasion for personal profit, and advocacy of tax evasion through damaging Internal
Revenue Service buildings or files.
78. 572 F.2d at 624. See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
79. Id.
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no doubt that the content of speech might go well beyond advocacy
of mere reform and still be protected. Under Brandenburg, even
speech that advocates violent criminal actions is protected unless it
runs afoul of the limitations set forth in both the content and context
tests."0
In Buttorff, therefore, the content of the defendants' speech was
obviously protected when it amounted to nothing more than advocacy of tax reform. It was still protected when it crossed the line from
discourse on the unconstitutionality of taxes to become actual advocacy of tax evasion. Tax evasion is a crime, but Brandenburgmakes
it very clear that advocacy of criminal activity may be protected.5 '
The Buttorff court must have meant, therefore, that the defendants'
speech lost its first amendment protection when it passed from a
general advocacy of tax avoidance into an actual explanation of the
specific means of avoiding taxes. A more precise description of the
line between protected and unprotected advocacy, as drawn by the
Buttorff court, would be one between general advocacy of criminal
activity and advocacy of the specific means of committing a criminal
act.
In Brandenburg, however, the demarcation between protected
and unprotected advocacy was not drawn according to the specificity
of the acts advocated, but according to the imminence of the acts.82
Advocacy is unprotected only when it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action," not "illegal action at some indefinite future time."'" The Buttorff court, in drawing the content line
between general criminal advocacy and advocacy of the means of
commission, failed to analyze whether "imminence" was present.
The court thus ignored the distinction between protected and unprotected advocacy drawn by the legal standard it carefully stated and
purported to follow.
It may be argued that speech advocating illegal activity and
detailing the means of accomplishment of such illegality evidences
the speaker's intent that such crime occur imminently. In other
words, an explanation of the specific means of committing a crime is
so close to the actual commission of a crime itself as to render such
advocacy unprotected under Brandenburg'scontent test. As already
80. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197,
1202-03 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 291 (1978).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

395 U.S. at 447. See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra.
395 U.S. at 447.
Id.
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973).
See T. EMERSON, supra note 26, at 405. Professor Emerson suggests that a

distinction between general and specific advocacy may be one way of separating protected expression from expression bordering on action, which is not protected:
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discussed, however, one of the purposes of the imminence requirement is to allow prohibition of advocacy of illegality only in those
cases in which there is insufficient time to counter the danger posed
by the criminality advocated."8 Hence, when imminence is not shown
and there is an opportunity for the intervention of independent rational thought and forces of authority, the protections of the first
amendment need not be infringed. With this functional analysis of
the imminence requirement in mind, one could effectively argue that
advocacy of tax fraud, no matter how detailed, could never amount
7
to an incitement of imminent illegal activity.
The defendants in Buttorff explained to their audience that tax
The more general the communication-the more it relates to general issues,
is addressed to a number of persons, urges general action-the more readily
it is classified as expression. On the other hand, communication that is
specifically concerned with a particular law, aimed at a particular person,
and urges particular action, moves closer to action. Communication also
tends to become action as the speaker assumes a personal relation to the
listener, deals with him on a face-to-face basis, or participates in an agency
or partnership arrangement. Other factors may affect the ultimate determination of whether the communication is expression or action. The essential
issue is whether the speaker has made himself a participant in a crime or
attempted crime of action. Short of this the community must satisfy itself
with punishment of the one who committed the violation of law or attempted to do so, not punishment of the person who communicated with him
about it.
Id. The Buttorff court considered the specificity of the defendants' advocacy, a factor
that, according to Professor Emerson, would point toward not protecting their speech.
The court did not, however, consider the fact that the defendants' speech was addressed to the public rather than specific individuals, a factor that would point to
categorization of the advocacy as protected speech. Although there were some allegations that Buttorff and Dodge individually counseled some of the principals, it is not
clear from their convictions whether the alleged individual consultations or the public
advocacy constituted the actual aiding and abetting. See note 112 infra.
Professor Emerson's analysis quoted above is a detailed explanation of his broader
observation that a speaker should not become criminally liable for the activities to
which his speech may ultimately contribute unless the speaker's "communication is
so close, direct, effective, and instantaneous in its impact that it is part of the action.
The speaker must, in effect, be an agent in the action." T. EMERsoN, supra note 26, at
404. It would appear, therefore, under Professor Emerson's analysis, that a lawyer who
helped a client commit tax fraud by advocating certain fraudulent techniques would
not have a first amendment claim even if his aiding and abetting was limited to speech.
In such a case the advocacy would be of detailed means; the advice would be given in
private rather than by public oration; and an agency relationship clearly would exist
between the lawyer and his client. The lawyer-client hypothetical case would thus
appear to be clearly distinguishable from the Buttorff situation.
86. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
87. The Buttorff court admitted that the defendants' speeches "do not incite the
type of imminent lawless activity referred to in criminal syndicalism cases .

F.2d at 624.

"572
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avoidance could be accomplished by calculating the number of personal exemptions that would eliminate their withholding tax, claiming that number on W-4 forms, and submitting those bogus forms to
their employer." Although the means described were grossly simple,",
requiring more audacity than criminal skill, they nevertheless required members of the audience to make computations and to carry
out the paperwork over a long enough time period to permit them to
contemplate the consequences of their acts. There was certainly an
opportunity for rational thought and time for intervention by forces
of authority between the moment of advocacy and the consummation
of the crime."
First amendment cases dealing with advocacy of illegal activity
have rarely, if ever, involved nonviolent, passionless crimes such as
tax fraud." In all cases in which speech has been prosecuted on a
theory of accessorial liability, after advocacy of an illegal act resulted
in performance of that act, the acts advocated were ones that involved violence or passion and that were palpably "imminent" at the
moment of advocacy.2 People v. Bohmer, 3 apparently the only reported case other than Buttorff in which pure speech has been prose88. Id. at 622-23.
89. The nature of this type of tax fraud itself negates imminence. A withholding
certificate must be filed with, accepted, and implemented by an employer. Even if
employees filed false forms, an unsympathetic employer could prevent or delay their
effect. In this way, the filing of W-4 forms is unlike tax forms filed directly with the
Internal Revenue Service.
In Buttorff there was no evidence to suggest that the principals filed false forms
immediately after the defendants' speech. Upon the principals' first attempts to submit the forms, their employer refused to accept them. When the forms were finally
filed, the employer ignored them and continued to withhold taxes on the basis of
correct prior forms. Brief for Appellant Dodge, supranote 2, at 3. There was a significant lapse in time.
90.. In fact, Internal Revenue Service agents made a personal visit to the principals and warned them of the consequences of filing false withholding statements. Id.
at 3.
91. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (antiwar riot); Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (threat to assassinate President Johnson); Collin v. Smith,
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (march by Nazi Party members), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 291
(1978); United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.) (advocating assassination of
foreign leader), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d
340 (7th Cir. 1972) (street riot), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); United States v.
Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969) (draft evasion); Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (inflamatory labor union publication). But see, e.g., Gay Alliance of
Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976) (advocacy by campus homosexual
group); High 01' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 449 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (printing of
drug-related material).
92. See, e.g., People v. Bohmer, 46 Cal. App. 3d 185, 120 Cal. Rptr. 136, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975).
93. Id.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:641

cuted under a general aiding and abetting statute, is a good example.
In that case, the California Supreme Court upheld the aiding and
abetting conviction of an antiwar demonstrator who, with a bullhorn,
directed the erection of a wooden barricade on railroad tracks in order
to damage a freight train carrying military equipment. The criminal
act in Bohmer actually occurred while the defendant was directing
the effort.14 Despite obvious differences between the imminence of
illegal activity in a case like Bohmer and that in a case like Buttorff,
the Eighth Circuit court concluded that the content of the speech of
defendants Buttorff and Dodge was unprotected.95
After summarily disposing of the content issue, the Buttorff
court had to deal with the context branch of the Brandenburgstandard. 6 Whereas the court offered some reasoning on the content question, there is no evidence that it even considered the context analysis
required by Brandenburg.The court appeared to find the mere fact
of commission of tax fraud by the principals to be a sufficient showing
of the likelihood of imminent lawless action to meet the Brandenburg
context requirement." The Buttorff court, therefore, substituted the
weak causal test of the aiding and abetting statute-"some affirmative participation which at least encourages the perpetrator"9 -for
the key first amendment protections of likelihood and imminence."
94. Id. at 197-98, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
95. 572 F.2d at 624.
96. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
97. 572 F.2d at 624.
98. Id. at 623 (quoting United States v. Wiebold, 507 F.2d 932, 934 (8th Cir.
1974), which was quoting United States v. Thomas, 469 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 957 (1973)).
99. Such an open-ended test of causality as developed under the aiding and
abetting statute, when applied to the regulation of a fundamental right, raises significant evidentiary questions on whether there were intervening causes between the
speech and the subsequent crime. An important protective aspect of the Brandenburg
requirements of imminence and likelihood is the assurance that, if the fundamental
right of speech must be regulated at all, it will at least be regulated only in those cases
where it is very closely linked to the subsequent criminality. The longer the time lapse
between the speech and the crime, the more difficult it becomes to assure a significant
causal relationship, and the more likely it becomes that intervening causes are present.
Several commentators have recognized the problems created by substituting criminal standards for first amendment protections in discussion of cases involving conspiracy charges. They emphasize the dangers involved in such criminalization of pure
speech, free from constitutional constraints on government conduct. See Filvaroff,
supra note 65; Nathanson, Freedom of Associationand the Questfor InternalSecurity:
Conspiracyfrom Dennis to Dr. Spock, 65 Nw.U. L. Rxv. 153 (1970); Note, Conspiracy:
Legitimate Instrument or an Unconstitutioital Weapon? 3 COLUM. SuavEv HuMAN
RIGHTs L. 94 (1971); Note, supra note 65.
Filvaroff notes that many of the difficulties that exist when conspiracy law is
applied to pure speech also apply with regard to aiding and abetting. He proposes that
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When a crime advocated is ultimately committed and a sufficient
causal link is found between advocacy and the crime to satisfy a
broad aiding and abetting statute, the court would apparently consider the important second prong of Brandenburgsatisfied.'" Thus,
culpability may be determined by future events alone, without inquiry into whether they were foreseeable, to say nothing of likely or
imminent, at the moment of advocacy.
Under the Brandenburg context test, it is the moment of advocacy that is relevant in determining the likelihood of imminent criminality, not what occurs subsequent to the speech. 10 Such an interpretation is compelled by a consideration of the purposes of the imminence limitation on free speech." 2 The moment of advocacy is the
crucial moment, since it is at that time that the speaker must decide
whether to exercise his first amendment right. When faced with an
imminent likelihood of criminal activity, a speaker is able to perceive
his probable liability and tailor his speech accordingly. When the
protection or nonprotection of speech may be determined solely by
subsequent events, however, the speaker may be sanctioned for acts
that were not foreseeable at the time of the speech. With this broadened range of potential liability in mind, the speaker may hesitate
to engage in any kind of advocacy that could conceivably be construed as encouraging illegality and his first amendment right would
seriously be chilled." 3
It may be argued that even at the moment of the speech, the
likelihood of imminent lawless activity was, or ought to have been,
evident to Buttorff and Dodge. They were invited to speak to a group
they knew to be interested in tax evasion'014 and questions asked by
the audience showed their curiosity about precise means of evading
taxes.'"' The Buttorff court, however, made no inquiry into these
context factors,'0 finding determinative the fact that the crime advothe combination of conspiracy with speech crimes he held unconstitutional. Filvaroff,
supra note 65, at 249-51. See also United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 184 (1st Cir.
1969) (Coffin, J., dissenting).
100. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
101. 395 U.S. at 448. See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972); Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10, 18 (N.D. Cal.
1977). But see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516 (1951). Instead of having
looked to the moment of advocacy, Buttorff could be read as following the Dennis view
of denying protection to speech that has a mere tendency to produce forcible action.
Id. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
102. See text accompanying notes 34-41 supra.
103. See T. EMERSON, supra note 26, at 405. See also notes 40-41 supra and
accompanying text.
104. Brief for Appellant Dodge, supra note 2, at 2.
105. 572 F.2d at 622.
106. Id. at 624.
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cated had been committed.
There is little precedent on the issue of what effect subsequent
commission of a crime should have on the context inquiry. In
Brandenburg,as well as in most of the cases following it, the courts
did not deal with the subsequent commission of the advocated crime
by members of the audience.' 7 Inquiry was focused on the moment
of advocacy either because the criminal activity advocated never
came about or was never prosecuted. Even those few cases in which
advocated action actually occurred and the speaker was prosecuted
on a theory of accessorial liability offer little guidance. In People v.
Bohmer,'1" for instance, the court may have considered the actual
commission to be important in its examination of the Brandenburg
context branch, but the principal crime in that case occurred simultaneously with the speech. The moment of the actual commission was
the same as the moment of advocacy. The California Supreme Court
did not, therefore, consider the effect that subsequent commission
would have had on first amendment protection.
Treating subsequent commission of a crime as relevant evidence
of the likelihood of imminent illegality is a questionable practice.
Given the purposes served by the imminence requirement, it appears
that it should not be decisive on the context question.'" Conceivably,
a speaker could make a speech before an apparently unreceptive
audience containing one extremist who subsequently commits the
crime advocated by the speaker. Under Buttorff, the speaker's advocacy would be unprotected. If a causal relationship sufficient to establish aiding and abetting could be drawn between the acts of the
individual and the advocacy, the speech would be tainted after the
fact despite the apparent unlikelihood of imminent criminality at the
moment of advocacy.
The Buttorff court's final justification for its holding on the first
amendment issue was that defendants' speech worked to
"substantially hinder

. . .

the administration of the revenue.""' Al-

though there is no analogous factor in the Brandenburgstandard, the
court appears to be putting into balance the relative weights of the
defendants' right to advocate nonpayment of taxes under the first
amendment, and the government's interest in the unhampered
collection of taxes.
Balancing tests have often been used in first amendment cases
involving symbolic expression that is not pure speech."' Balancing
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See note 50 supra and cases cited therein.
46 Cal. App. 3d 185, 120 Cal. Rptr. 136, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975).
See text accompanying notes 34-41 supra.
572 F.2d at 624.
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines School

1979]

ILLEGAL SPEECH

has not been used, however, in cases in which the regulated activity
is pure speech, since such expression has been held to require more
protection from infringement. 12 But on a policy level, the limitations
on the absolute protection of pure speech that have been adopted by
the courts can, in a sense, be viewed as a balancing of values:"' on
the one hand is the need to encourage full discussion and exchange
of ideas; on the other is the need to protect society. Where speech
contributes relatively little to the market-place of ideas and creates
a great risk to the social order, these limitations may cause it to be
regulated. Hence, the apparently absolute test set out in
Brandenburg may be partially reducible to a balancing of values,"4
although the balance is weighted in favor of protecting speech.
Speech that is unprotected under Brandenburg's standard is no
longer contributing to the robust discussion of ideas; advocacy that
presents an imminent threat of illegality leaves no time for rational
dialogue."' Moreover, such speech is posing an immediate risk to the
social order."'
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); note 16

supra.
Courts considering cases arising under the free exercise clause of the first amendment employ a similar balancing analysis. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protection of fundamental privacy rights under substantive due process).
112. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
[W]hen a single-count indictment . . . charges the commission of a
crime by virtue of the defendant's having done both a constitutionally protected act [pure speech] and one which may be unprotected [unlawful
symbolic action], and a guilty verdict ensues without elucidation, there is
an unacceptable danger that the trier of fact will have regarded the two acts
as "intertwined" and have rested the conviction on both together.
Id. at 588.
113. See 395 U.S. at 447. See also cases cited in notes 17-21 supra.
114. But see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967) (it is inappropriate
to balance fundamental first amendment freedoms with governmental interests). See
generally BeVier, supranote 24, at 340-43 in which it is argued that the Brandenburg
test, although ostensibly one of absolute categorization, is flexible enough to take into
account pragmatic and institutional concerns, much on the order of traditional ad hoc
balancing inquiries.
115. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
116. See text accompanying note 39 supra. Although the Brandenburgstandard
does not expressly require an assessment of the gravity of the incited crime, prior case
law on which it purports to rely suggests such a requirement. First, Brandenburg
specifically overruled Whitney for failing to require imminence, thereby embracing
Brandeis' concurring view in Witney, a view that accorded great emphasis to the
seriousness of the question. 395 U.S. at 447. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Second, the BrandenburgCourt "discovered" its
formula in the principles fashioned by cases like Dennis, which relied heavily on the
degree of seriousness of the advocated crime. 395 U.S. at 447. See Dennis v. United
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In Buttorff, the court appears to indicate that the hindrance to
the administration of revenue is a threat to the social order sufficient
to justify an infringement on the first amendment rights of Buttorff
and Dodge." 7 Examining the facts of the case, however, the risk to
social order and to the collection of taxes posed by the defendants'
speech seems rather slight. All fifteen principal tax evaders were
contacted and counseled by the Internal Revenue Service prior to
their commission of fraud."' Upon commission of the act, they were
apprehended and convicted,' 9 and the news of their conviction was
widely publicized, maximizing its general deterrent effect.12 The
administration of revenue was clearly protectable by means other
than regulating speech and infringing the first amendment freedoms
of Buttorff and Dodge.
The ultimate effect that Buttorff will have on first amendment
protection of speech advocating illegality is at this time hard to predict. Whether application of this truncated version of the
Brandenburgprotection marks an aberration or the beginning of a
trend will be decided when the Supreme Court next addresses the
question. For the present at least, it is clear that Buttorff has suggested several important changes in the contours of the Brandenburg
standard. First, in the analysis of protected content, Buttorff has laid
the ground work for a distinction between general advocacy of criminal activity and advocacy of the specific means of accomplishing
crime, thus ignoring Brandenburg'sdistinction drawn along lines of
imminence. In so doing, Buttorff has shown that public advocacy, if
sufficiently detailed to be construed as aiding and abetting, can be
unprotected even if the type of crime advocated can only be committed after independent thought and reflection. The crime need not be
violent; its commission need not be immediate. By ruling as it did,
the Buttorff court extended the scope of unprotected speech to cover
advocacy bearing little resemblance to the sort of advocacy found
States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). Professor Laurence Tribe recognizes this interpretation, pointing out that "[i]t remains to be seen whether the test announced in
Brandenburg is flexible enough to make the answers it gives depend in part on how
severe a harm is threatened." L. TmBE, supra note 24, at 617 n.58.
117. 572 F.2d at 624.
118. Brief for Appellant Dodge, supra note 2, at 3.
119. See United States v. Hinderman, 528 F.2d 100, 101 (8th Cir. 1976).
120. See Brief for Appellant Buttorff, supra note 2, at 35. The principals were
apparently referred to by the local media as the "Dubuque 15." Brief for Appellant
Dodge, supra note 2, at 3. See also Brief for Appellant Buttorff, supra note 2, at 10
(implication that the "IRS

. .

. and the prosecuting attorney ...

concurrent with

Grand Jury proceedings, [arrange] widespread publicity . . . for news releases to
break ... on days when there are not many other news stories," to achieve a deterrent
effect as well as prejudice the defendants); note 123 infra.
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unprotected in the past. In its cursory elimination of traditional landmarks that distinguish between protected and unprotected content,
the Buttorff court did much to blur the distinction between advocacy
of imminent crime and advocacy of the sort of unpopular, extreme
political views the expression of which is at the heart of first amendment protection.
Buttorff has virtually eliminated the Brandenburg context inquiry into the likelihood of imminent lawless action at the time of
advocacy. Instead, the context test is met by the mere showing that
the advocated criminal act was subsequently committed. As the facts
of Buttorff demonstrate, the subsequent crime need not even take
place immediately for the court to make this post hoc attribution of
likelihood to the moment of advocacy. The protection that the imminence requirement affords the speaker against a first amendment
chill is completely lost.
What the Buttorff court has done, in effect, is substitute a tenuous causal standard developed under the aiding and abetting statute for the rigors of the Brandenburgtest. It would not appear to be
going too far to say that after Buttorff, speech that amounts to an
aiding and abetting is simply no longer protected speech.
Because the Buttorff decision offers little express reasoning for
its first amendment decision, it is not easy to explain why the court
took this novel approach. It may have overreacted to the fact that the
defendants' advocacy was followed by commission of the advocated
crime. As discussed above,' 2' there is little precedent on this point
and the court may have been unclear on what effect subsequent crime
should have on the Brandenburg test. The dispositive effect that the
court gave it seems both insensitive to the first amendment interests
at stake and disproportionate to the threat posed to social order. The
Buttorff decision may also be explained as a governmental reaction
to the growing antitax movement.'2 If so, the result appears to be
unnecessary, at least on the facts present in Buttorff. Enforcement
of the tax laws against the principal criminal activity appeared quite
effective.'1 The court nevertheless may have felt it necessary to com121. See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
122. See generally Breckenfeld, We're Playing with Machetes, FORTUNE, Sept.
25, 1978, at 80; NAT'L REv., July 7, 1978, at 818; NEWSWEEK, June 19, 1978, at 20; T"IE,
Sept. 25, 1978, at 48; TiE, June 26, 1978, at 8; U.S. NEws & WoR REP., Nov. 20,
1978, at 103; U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., June 26, 1978, at 17.
123. One judicial concern might have been that although prosecution of the
principals in the case was effective, it was not very efficient. The principals' ineptitude
made them easy prey for law enforcement; but no matter how easy the prosecutions,
they were numerous. Although prosecution of advocates Buttorff and Dodge would
appear to be a more efficient way to go about deterring future tax fraud, prosecutorial
efficiency is not normally a rationale for allowing regulation of otherwise protected
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bat the growing danger of mass tax evasion by taking a lax approach
to first amendment protection.
Even if Buttorff may be explained as a reaction to the antitax
movement, the decision will likely not be limited in application to
future tax evasion cases. It has set a dangerous precedent for all
future first amendment controversies over advocacy of illegal acts.
Traditional strictness has been relaxed, lines have been blurred, and
the aiding and abetting statute has been revealed as a new prosecutorial device with an alarming potential for repression of unpopular,
dissenting political speech.

speech. See text accompanying notes 23-24, 111-16 supra. But see United States v.
Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978) (approving the first amendment constitutionality
of IRS selective prosecution techniques of trying to maximize prosecutorial efficiency
and deterrent effect by concentrating efforts on those offenders who are engaged in tax
protest and have gained the most notoriety).

